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EVIDENCE-APPLICATION OF RULE 609(a) IN CIVIL CONTEXTS:
A SENSIBLE APPROACH?
Green v. Bock Laundry Machine Co.,
109 S. Ct. 1981 (1989)
I. INTRODUCTION
As a result of the Supreme Court's decision in Green v. Bock Laundry Machine Co.,1 a
civil plaintiff may now be impeached with evidence of his prior felony convictions without
regard for the prejudice to his civil claim. The Court's holding that Federal Rule of Evi-
dence 609(a)2 requires a judge to allow impeachment of a civil witness's credibility with
evidence of that witness's prior felony convictions resolved a split in the circuits as to
whether application of rule 609(a) in the civil context required automatic admissibility or
balancing under rule 609 or rule 403.
Basing its decision on the construction of the rule's plain language3 and on an investiga-
tion of the rule's legislative history,4 the Court opted for automatic admissibility and re-
jected both 609 and 609/403 balancing. The Court first determined that rule 609(a)
overrides a judge's general discretionary authority under rule 403' to balance the probative
value of impeachment evidence against its prejudicial effect except as to criminal defen-
dants.6 The Court then held that rule 609(a) does require a judge to allow evidence of a
civil witness's prior felony convictions for impeachment purposes without any regard for
resulting prejudice to the party who offers the testimony or to the witness.7
This note first examines the Green decision in light of the Supreme Court's investigation
into the rule's legislative history, prior judicial interpretation of rule 609(a), and the
Court's construction of the rule's language. The effects of the Court's denial of judicial
discretion in weighing the probative value of impeachment evidence against its prejudicial
effects except as to criminal defendants are then discussed.
1. 109 S. Ct. 1981 (1989).
2. FED. R. Evio. 609. Rule 609(a)(1) reads as follows:
For the purpose of attacking the credibility of a witness, evidence that he has been convicted of a crime shall be admitted
if elicited from him or established by public record during cross-examination but only if the crime (1) was punishable by
death or imprisonment in excess of one year under the law under which he was convicted, and the court determines that
the probative value of admitting this evidence outweighs its prejudicial effect to the defendant ....
Id. Seealso Green, 109 S. Ct. at 1984.
3. Green, 109 S. Ct. at 1984-85.
4. Id. at 1986-92.
5. FED. R. EviD. 403. Rule 403 reads in relevant part as fbllows: "Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its proba-
tive value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice .... "Green, 109 S. Ct. at 1983 n.2.
6. Green, 109 S. Ct. at 1992-93.
7. Id. at 1993.
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II. FACTS
Paul Green, 8 a nineteen-year-old 9 inmate at a county prison, was employed at a car
wash in a prison work-release program. 10 Green's job entailed wiping cars dry after they
had been washed, but he was also required to launder the towels used in the car wash.11
This second duty involved his operating a centrifugal water extractor manufactured by
Bock Laundry Machine Co. (Bock).12 Six days after he had begun working at the car
wash,13 Green wrapped a towel around his hand and reached inside the machine to slow it
down.14 Apparently, the towel became entangled in the drum, 15 and Green's right arm was
torn off.16 Green brought a products liability action against Bock, the manufacturer of the
machine, claiming that he had not been adequately instructed in the machine's operation
or adequately informed about its dangerousness. 17
At the time of the trial, Green, then twenty-two, had a record of convictions for corrup-
tion of the morals of a minor, statutory rape, criminal trespass, burglary, and conspiracy to
commit burglary, all of which were punishable by imprisonment for more than one year. 
18
In response to Green's motion in limine requesting that his prior criminal record be ex-
cluded,19 the trial court ruled that, except for the corruption of the morals of a minor
charge, the convictions could be used for the purposes of impeachment.2"
To impeach Green's credibility, at trial Bock elicited admissions that Green had been
convicted of the felonies of burglary and conspiracy to commit burglary.21 After the jury
returned a verdict for Bock, Green appealed, arguing that the denial of his pretrial motion
to exclude the impeaching evidence of his prior criminal record constituted error.22 Fol-
lowing circuit court of appeals' precedent and concluding that rule 609(a)(1) mandates ad-
mission for impeachment purposes of a civil plaintiff's prior felony convictions, the Court
of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed the ruling of the district court.23
In order to resolve a split in the circuits as to the application of rule 609(a)(1) regarding
discretionary balancing, the United States Supreme Court granted certiorari 24 and af-
firmed the judgment of the court of appeals.2
8. Green was the petitioner in this action.
9. Brief for the Petitioner at 5, Green v. Bock Laundry Mach. Co., 845 F.2d 1011 (3d Cir. 1988) (No. 87-1816), affd, 109
S. Ct. 1981 (1989).
10. Green, 109 S. Ct. at 1982-83.
11. Brief for the Petitioner at 5.
12. Id.
13. Green, 109 S. Ct. at 1983.
14. Brief for the Petitioner at 7.
15. Id.
16. Green, 109S. Ct. at 1983.
17. Id.
18. Brief for the Respondent at 4, Green v. Bock Laundry Mach. Co., 845 F. 2d 1011 (3d Cir. 1988) (No. 87-1816), affd, 109
S. Ct. 1981 (1989).
19. Id.
20. Id. atS.
21. Green, 109S. Ct. at 1983.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. 108 S. Ct. 2843 (1988).
25. Green, 109 S. Ct. at 1994.
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III. HISTORY AND BACKGROUND
A. Common Law
The practice of allowing impeachment by evidence of a witness's criminal convictions
can be traced to common law beginnings. At common law a person convicted of treason, a
felony, or an offense involving fraud or deceit, was considered "unworthy of belief' and
therefore incompetent as a witness.26 However, over a period of time this absolute inter-
diction was abandoned by the courts and replaced with a rule that allowed a witness to tes-
tify subject to impeachment of his credibility by admission of evidence of prior
convictions.27
The courts' adoption of this rule was predicated upon the necessity of providing the jury
with all evidence that reflected upon the credibility of the witness. 28 However, the practi-
cal effect of the rule was that a criminal defendant became fearful that evidence of prior
convictions would operate as an implication of guilt in the crime charged. As a result, a
defendant was less than eager to testify on his own behalf.
29
Recognizing the effects of automatic admissibility of prior conviction evidence, the
United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit held in Luck v. United
States30 that a trial judge had discretion to exclude prior conviction evidence if the evidence
was offered to impeach a defendant-witness.31 While it acknowledged that the exclusion of
such evidence in order to avoid prejudice to a criminal defendant could also result in the
exclusion of evidence relevant to the witness's credibility, the Luck court nonetheless em-
phasized that" 'it is more important to the search for truth in a particular case for the jury
to hear the defendant's story than to know of a prior conviction.' "32
In Gordon v. United States,33 the District of Columbia Circuit refined the Luck doctrine.
Circuit Judge Burger suggested a number of factors that a court should consider in applying
discretionary balancing for the purpose of determining the admissibility of prior convic-
tion evidence for impeaching a defendant-witness: (1) the nature of the.crime, (2) the
time of conviction and the witness's subsequent history, (3) similarity between the past
crime and the charged crime, (4) the importance of the defendant's testimony, and (5) the
34centrality of the credibility issue.
Not only were Luck discretionary balancing and the factors proposed in Gordon the
predecessors of rule 609-they were also its prototype.35 With the enactment of the Fed-
eral Rules of Evidence came rule 609(a), which bore little resemblance to either of its com-
mon law predecessors, but which did establish a statutory delineation of the circumstances
26.3 J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE 609[021, at 609-58 (1985) [hereinafter WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE].
27. Id. See Note, Evidence -Diggs v. Lyons: The Use of Prior Criminal Convictions to Impeach Credibility in Civil Actions
Under Rule 609(a), 60 TUL. L. REV. 863, 864 & n.7 (1986) [hereinafter Use of Prior Criminal Convictions to Impeach Credibil-
ity].
28. Note, Balancing Prejudice in Admitting Prior Felony Convictions in Civil Actions: Resolving the 609(a) (1) -403 Conflict, 63
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 333, 335 (1988) [hereinafter Balancing Prejudice].
29. Id. at 336.
30. 348 F.2d 763 (D.C. Cir. 1965).
31. Balancing Prejudice, supra note 28, at 336.
32. Id. (quoting Luck v. United States, 348 F.2d 763, 769 (D.C. Cir. 1965)),
33. 383 F.2d 936 (D.C. Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 1029 (1968).
34. WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE, supra note 26, at 609-66 to 609-72 (citing Gordon v. United States, 383 F.2d 936,940-41 (D.C.
Cir. 1967)).
35. WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE, supra note 26, at 609-65.
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under which evidence of a witness's prior criminal conviction may be admitted for the pur-
pose of impeaching his credibility. Rule 609(a) states specific requirements: First, such
evidence must be "elicited from the witness or established by public record during cross-
examination." Second, evidence of a prior conviction is admissible only if the crime "was
punishable by death or imprisonment in excess of one year under the law under which the
witness was convicted." Third, in addition to the requirement that the conviction must
have been for a felony, is the necessity for the court to "determine[ ] that the probative
value of admitting this evidence outweighs its prejudicial effect to the defendant." Finally,
the rule stipulates that evidence of conviction for any crime "involv[ing] dishonesty or false
statement . . . shall be admitted . . ., regardless of the punishment" and without the
exercise of judicial balancing. 36
Because the federal courts had been following a variety of rules with respect to admissi-
bility of prior conviction evidence37 -some allowing discretionary balancing and others
requiring automatic admission - Congress was faced with no easy task - to construct a rule
that would resolve the conflict between the two approaches.
B. Legislative History
From the time that it was originally drafted38 until the time that it was finally enacted,39
rule 609(a) underwent an extensive formulation process. The original version of the rule
required admission of impeaching evidence without balancing of probative value against
prejudicial effect and provided:
For the purposes of attacking the credibility of a witness, evidence that he has been convicted
of a crime is admissible but only if the crime (1) was punishable by death or imprisonment in
excess of one year under the law under which he was convicted or (2) involved dishonesty or
false statement regardless of the punishment.
40
The House rejected this version and proposed a rule that would only allow admission of
impeaching evidence "of convictions bearing directly on credibility":41 "For the purpose
of attacking the credibility of a witness, evidence that he has been convicted of a crime is
admissible only if the crime involved dishonesty or false statement."
42
When this proposed rule was sent to the Senate, the Senate considered a version that
would have allowed "[w]ith respect to defendants, only convictions of crimen falsi [to] be
used,"4 but "[w]ith respect to other witnesses, convictions of felonies . . . subject to the
balancing test."4 The Senate-proposed rule would also have limited the admissibility of
impeaching evidence to that "elicited from [the witness] or established by public record
36. FED. R. EvID. 609(a).
37. WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE, supra note 26, at 609-64.
38. The Advisory Committee on Rules of Evidence of the Judicial Conference of the United States drafted three different
versions of rule 609 -one in 1969, a second in 197 1, and the third in 1972. Id. at 609-15 to 609-16.
39. Act of Jan. 2, 1975, Pub. L. No. 93-595. § 1, 88 Stat. 1935 (1975).
40. H.R. REP. No. 650, 93d Cong., 1 st Sess. 11, reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CoNG. & ADMIN. NEws 7075, 7084 [hereinaf-
ter H.R. REp. No. 650].
4 1. Id. at 7085.
42. 120 CoNG. REc. 2374 (1974).
43. Diggs v. Lyons, 741 F.2d 577, 580 (3d Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1078 (1985).
44. Id.
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during cross-examination."" However, the amendment that the Senate finally adopted
provided for "admission of all felonies and crimen falsi with no balancing test."
46
The Conference Committee proposed a compromise between the House and Senate
versions which incorporated "the Senate amendment with an amendment"47 and author-
ized impeachment of a defendant by evidence of a felony conviction only after judicial bal-
ancing of the evidence's probative value against its prejudicial effect. 48 Once adopted by
both houses, that compromise version became what is now Federal Rule of Evidence
609(a).'9 Relative to judicial discretion and crimes involving dishonesty and false state-
ment, the conferees stated: "The admission of prior convictions involving dishonesty and
false statement is not within the discretion of the Court. Such convictions are peculiarly
probative of credibility and, under this rule, are always to be admitted. ,50 As to judicial
discretion and felony convictions, the conferees stressed that the prejudice to be consid-
ered was only prejudice to the defendant. 
5 1
While the conferees did consider prejudicial dangers to witnesses other than the defen-
dant,5 2 they determined that such prejudice is merely one element that can be weighed in
the determination of admissibility53 and that the trier of fact's need for all possible evidence
relevant to the issue of credibility outweighs the danger of prejudice to any witness besides
the defendant.5 4 The conferees concluded that prior conviction evidence should "only be
excluded where it presents a danger of improperly influencing the outcome of the trial by
persuading the trier-of-fact to convict the defendant on the basis of his prior criminal re-
cord."55
The Conference Report use of "to convict" in conjunction with "defendant" seems to
limit the applicability of rule 609(a)(1)'s balancing test to the criminal context;56 however,
at least four Congressmen-Representatives Hogan, 5 Dennis, 58 Wiggins,55 and Lott6"-
recognized that rule 609(a) could be applied in both civil and criminal cases.61
Since the language of 609(a) does not specifically indicate whether both civil and crimi-
nal cases implicate the rule, there has been little consistency in the rule's application.
45. 120 CoNG. REc. 37076 (1974).
46. Diggs, 741 F.2d at 580.
47. CONF. REP. No. 1597, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 9, reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 7098, 7102 [hereinaf-
ter CoNF. REP. No. 1597].
48. Id.
49. Diggs, 741 F.2d at 580.





55. Id. (emphasis added).
56. Diggs, 741 F.2d at 580.
57. 120 CONG. REC. 2376 (1974).
58. Id. at 2377.
59. Id. at 2379.
60. Id. at 2381.
61. Diggs, 741 F.2d at 581.
1989]
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C. Judicial Interpretation
Since the enactment of the Federal Rules of Evidence in 1975,62 courts have disagreed
on the proper application of rule 609(a)(1).63 One commentator has suggested that "[t]his
confusion among the courts emphasizes the need for amendment if the use of prior convic-
tions to impeach civil witnesses is to continue."" Two cases-one from the Eighth Cir-
cuit, 65 the other from the Third Circuit, 66 both brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 - are
representative of the dichotomy among the courts relative to allowing discretionary judi-
cial balancing or requiring automatic admission of evidence of prior felony convictions for
impeachment purposes in civil cases.
John Czajka, the plaintiff in Czajka v. Hickman,67 claimed that he had been beaten by
jailers after he was caught attempting to escape. 6 8 Appealing a jury verdict for the defen-
dants, Czajka asserted as error the trial court's allowing him to be cross-examined about
prior rape and sexual assault convictions.69 Czajka argued that the trial court under rule
403 must balance the evidence's probative value against its prejudicial effect. The basis of
his argument was that "rape is a crime which shows only propensity to engage in criminal
behavior, not propensity to lie." 70 The defendants answered these arguments with a con-
tention that rule 609(a) expressly allows admission of felony conviction evidence for im-
71peachment purposes.
As a preface to its conclusion that the district court's failure to balance prejudicial effect
against probative value constituted harmless error,72 the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals
analyzed the relationship between Federal Rules of Evidence 403 and 609(a). The Eighth
Circuit agreed with the Fifth Circuit that "Rule 403 is 'a rule of exclusion that cuts across
the rules of evidence' ,73 but further stated that "it must be applied in civil cases when a
party seeks to cross-examine another about criminal convictions. Although it recog-
nized the argument made by some commentators that rule 609(a)(1) balancing does not
apply in civil cases, the court chose not to address that particular issue, concluding that
rule 609 does not operate to foreclose the court's responsibility for conducting discretion-
ary balancing when the admission of evidence of prior criminal convictions would result in
unfair prejudice. 7' The court reinforced this observation that the operation of one rule
does not exclude operation of the other by concluding: "Even if the intended focus of Rule
62. January 2, 1975, was the enactment date; July 1, 1975, was the effective date of Pub. L. No. 93-595, 88 Stat. 1926
(1975).
63. For an extensive treatment of the varying positions, see Foster, Rule 609(a) in the Civil Context: A Recommendation for
Reform, 57 FORDHAM L. REV. 1, 12-15 (1988) [hereinafter Rule 609(a) in the Civil Context]; Note, Prior Convictions Offered for
Impeachment in Civil Trials: The Interaction of Federal Rules of Evidence 609(a) and 403, 54 FORDHAM L. REv. 1063, 1063-64 n.3
(1984) [hereinafter The Interaction of Federal Rules of Evidence 609(a) and 403].
64. Rule 609(a) in the Civil Context, supra note 63, at 12.
65. Czajka v. Hickman, 703 F.2d 317 (8th Cir. 1983).
66. Diggs v. Lyons, 741 F.2d 577 (3d Cir. 1984).
67. 703 F.2d 317 (8th Cir. 1983).
68. d. at 318.
69. The foregoing facts were taken from czajka, 703 F.2d at 318.
70.Id. at 318-19.
71. Id. at 319.
72. Id.
73. Id. (quoting Shows v. M/V Red Eagle, 695 F.2d 114, 118 (5th Cir. 1983)).
74. Czajka, 703 F.2d at 319 (emphasis added).
75. Id. (emphasis added) (citing Shows, 695 F.2d at 118).
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609 is avoidance of prejudice to criminal defendants, the Rule does not mandate a 'mechan-
ical and restrictive result when the party facing the potential prejudice is one other than a
criminal defendant.' -76 This conclusion indicates the Eighth Circuit's willingness to con-
duct discretionary balancing even in a civil context, should 609 apply.
A year later in Diggs v. Lyons 77 the Third Circuit also addressed the issue of the exercise
of judicial discretion in balancing the prejudicial effect against probative value but reached
an entirely different conclusion. As had John Czajka, Charles Diggs brought suit under 42
U.S.C. § 1983. Diggs alleged that the defendants had used excessive force to prevent his
escape from prison. On appeal from judgment for the defendants, Diggs argued that he
was entitled to a new trial because the trial judge had erroneously relied on rule 609(a) and
admitted impeaching evidence of Diggs' prior criminal convictions for murder, bank rob-
bery, attempted prison escape, and criminal conspiracy. 8
Following an extensive consideration of rule 609(a)'s legislative history,79 the court em-
phasized that the "mandatory terms" 80 of rule 609 requiring admission of evidence of fel-
ony convictions for impeachment purposes had been "thoroughly threshed out in the
Congress."8' The court recognized that Congress did not intend to allow judicial discre-
tion in admitting evidence of either felony convictions or crimen falsi, regardless of
whether the case was civil or criminal.8 2
Consistent with these conclusions, the Third Circuit affirmed the judgment of the dis-
trict court, agreeing with it that rule 609(a) required automatic admission of impeaching
evidence of felony convictions and that rule 403 discretionary balancing "did [not] operate
to modify rule 609(a)"8 3 because rule 403 "was not designed to override specific rules,
such as Rule 609, but rather to provide a guide for handling situations for which no specific
rules have been formulated."8'4
It was in Brown v. Flury,8 5 another section 1983 case, that the Eleventh Circuit Court of
Appeals specifically identified three legal issues relative to rule 609(a) upon which the cir-
cuits have been split.8 6 First is the issue of whether 609(a) balancing of probative value
with prejudicial effect applies in civil as well as criminal cases.8 7 Second is the issue of
whether the balancing test is to be applied to plaintiffs and non-party witnesses or just to
defendants.88 Third is the issue of whether rule 403 discretionary balancing applies even if
such balancing is not required by 609(a).8'
Although it enumerated these three issues, the Brown court did not itself address any of
them. Instead, it affirmed the district court's judgment, holding that "the facts in [the]
76. Czajka, 703 F2d at 319 (quoting Tussel v. Witco Chem. Corp., 555 F. Supp. 979, 983 (W.D. Pa. 1983)).
77. 741 F.2d 577 (3d Cir. 1984).
78. The foregoing facts were taken from Diggs, 741 F.2d at 578.
79. Id. at 579-81.
80. ld. at 581.
81. Id. at 582.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 579.
85. 848 F2d 158 (1 lth Cir. 1988).
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case render[ed] the requirement of a balancing test superfluous." 90 The inconsistency
among the circuits as to the application of 609(a) is apparent in civil cases other than those
brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Three months after its decision in Czajka v. Hick-
man 91 that rule 403 balancing was appropriate even if rule 609(a)(1) was not intended to
protect a civil plaintiff from prejudice resulting from admission of felony conviction evi-
dence, 92 the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals was again faced with a rule 609(a)(1) ques-
tion. Radtke v. Cessna Aircraft Co.93 was a products liability action brought by the
passengers of a Cessna-manufactured aircraft for injuries they received when the aircraft
crashed during takeoff. Cessna advanced a defense of pilot error to the Radtkes' claim that
the pilot had lost control of the plane when his seat came unlatched. The jury returned a
verdict for Cessna, and the Radtkes appealed. They claimed that the district court had
erred in allowing cross-examination of the pilot about his conviction on a drug charge.94
Since the pilot was a witness for the plaintiffs, and not a party to the suit, the Eighth
Circuit was called upon to decide an issue slightly different from the one decided by the
Czajka court - whether rules 403 and 609(a) applied to a civil witness. 95 After its determi-
nation that both rules do apply to a witness in a civil case,96 the Radtke court affirmed the
judgment of the district court,97 holding that the district court had not "abused its discre-
tion under rules 403 aind 609 by permitting cross examination of [the pilot] on [his] drug
conviction."98
In Linsky v. Hecker,99 a 1985 personal injury action, the First Circuit Court of Appeals
agreed with the district court that rule 609 does not apply in civil cases.100 However, the
Linsky court stopped short of agreeing with the Eighth Circuit that a court has discretion-
ary power to conduct rule 403 balancing and to exclude evidence of prior criminal convic-
tions if prejudicial effect substantially outweighs probative value.10'
The Linsky suit was brought by the mother of a fourteen-year-old boy who had been
injured in an accident involving his bicycle and a tractor trailer.' 02 Following ajury verdict
for the defendant, the plaintiff appealed. She contended that the district court had erred by
admitting evidence of the boy's fourteen criminal convictions in order to impeach his testi-
mony. 
03
Concluding that Congress intended rule 609 balancing to apply only to criminal defen-
dants, the First Circuit determined that the district court was not required by 609(a)(1) to
consider whether prejudice would result from admission of the prior felony convictions
90. Id.
91. 703 F.2d 317 (8th Cir. 1983).
92. Id. at 319.
93. 707 F.2d 999 (8th Cir. 1983).
94. The foregoing facts were taken from Radtke, 707 F.2d at 1000.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 1001.
97. Id. at 1002.
98. Id. at 1001.
99. 753 F.2d 199 (Ist Cir. 1985).
100. Id. at 202.
101. Id.
102. ld. at 200.
103. Id. at 201.
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evidence. 10 4 Although the Linsky court did not address the issue of whether "the district
court retained discretion to exclude evidence of . . . prior . . . convictions,"105 it af-
firmed the judgment of the district court, holding that no error had been committed by
admitting the impeaching evidence. 
106
In Petty v. Ideco, Division of Dresser Industries, Inc.,'°7 another case decided in 1985,
the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals held that rule 609(a)(1) balancing applies to plaintiffs in
civil cases. 0 8 Charles Petty brought a products liability action against Ideco for injuries he
received while operating a piece of equipment manufactured by Ideco. Petty alleged that
defective design and failure to instruct on the safe operation of the equipment resulted in
his left arm's being torn off when it became entangled in a rope attached to a winch. Ideco
answered that Petty's injury had been caused by his negligent use of the machine. After
the court enteredjudgment on the jury's verdict that Petty take nothing, Petty appealed, 0 9
asserting as error the trial court's admission of Petty's prior conviction for armed kidnap-
ping.
110
In affirming the district court judgment, the Fifth Circuit adhered to a prior determina-
tion that a trial court has broad discretion on whether to admit impeaching conviction evi-
dence after balancing probative value against prejudicial effect.111 The Petty court closed
its analysis of the issue of 609(a)(1)'s applicability to a civil plaintiff with the conclusion
that "the district court [had not] abused its broad discretion in admitting evidence of [Pet-
ty's] kidnapping conviction" after conducting 609(a)(1) balancing. 12
From the foregoing survey of circuit cases, a number of conflicting conclusions may be
drawn:
1. Rule 609(a) only allows consideration of prejudice to a criminal defendant. In a civil
case, 609(a) requires automatic admission of felony conviction evidence for impeachment
purposes. 
113
2. Whether or not rule 609 balancing applies only to criminal defendants, rule 403 re-
quires that probative value of felony conviction evidence be balanced against its prejudicial
effect to the civil plaintiff.114
3. No balancing test is to be applied if the witness is a civil plaintiff.
115
4. A trial court has discretion under both rule 403 and rule 609(a) to weigh prejudice to
a non-party witness in a civil case.
116
5. The 609(a) balancing test applies to a civil plaintiff.
117
104. Id.
105. Id. at 202.
106. Id.
107. 761 F.2d 1146 (5th Cir. 1985).
108. Id. at 1152.
109. The foregoing facts were taken from Petty, 761 F.2d at 1149.
110. Id. at 1152.
111. Id. (citing Howard v. Gonzales, 658 F.2d 352, 358-59 (5th Cir. 1981)).
112. Petty, 761 F.2d at 1152.
113. Brown v. Flury, 848 F.2d 158, 159 (1 lth Cir. 1988). See Campbell v. Greer, 831 F.2d 700 (7th Cir. 1987): Linsky v.
Hecker, supra note 99 and accompanying text.
114. Brown, 848 F.2d at 158. See Czajka v. Hickman, supra note 67 and accompanying text.
115. Brown, 848 F.2d at 158. See Diggs v. Lyons, supra note 77 and accompanying text.
116. Radtke v. Cessna Aircraft Co., supr note 93 and accompanying text.
117. Brown, 848 F.2d at 158. See Petty v. Ideco, supra note 107 and accompanying text.
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Green v. Bock Laundry Machine was not the first civil case to bring rule 609(a) to the
attention of the Supreme Court. When it was petitioned for certiorari to Diggs v. Lyons,'
the Supreme Court had the opportunity to address the issues raised by the ambiguous lan-
guage of rule 609(a) and to resolve the conflict among the circuits as to the rule's proper
application.
In a memorandum decision1 9 Justice White, joined by Justices Brennan and Marshall,
dissented from the Court's denial of certiorari to Diggs v. Lyons.1 20 Forming the basis of
the dissent was White's recognition that disagreement as to the role of discretionary bal-
ancing in a civil context had already affected litigants in the First, Third, and Eighth Cir-
cuit Courts of Appeals. 121 Because he foresaw the same conflicts arising elsewhere with
respect to what he called a "fundamental evidentiary rule," 122 White would have granted
certiorari in order to settle the issue of whether rule 609(a) allows discretionary balancing
or requires automatic admission of prior convictions evidence against a "plaintiff witness
in a civil case."
123
In Diggs, the Third Circuit closed its analysis of 609(a) in the civil context with a recog-
nition that "the mandatory admission of all felony convictions on the issue of credibility
may in some cases produce unjust and even bizarre results."124 It also issued a challenge:
"[I]f the rule is to be amended to eliminate these possibilities of injustice, it must be done
by those who have the authority to amend the rules, the Supreme Court and the Congress.
We, therefore, leave the problem to them."'12
It was in this atmosphere of judicial confusion and challenge that the United States Su-
preme Court granted certiorari to another Third Circuit case, Green v. Bock Laundry Ma-
chine Co. 126
IV. INSTANT CASE
In Green v. Bock Laundry Machine Co. 127 the United States Supreme Court addressed
for the first time the issue of whether Federal Rule of Evidence 609(a)(1) requires a judge
to allow impeachment of a civil witness's credibility with evidence of the witness's prior
felony convictions. 128 The Court began its inquiry by recognizing that its "task in deciding
this case [was] not to fashion the rule [it] deem[ed] desirable but to identify the rule that
Congress fashioned." 29 In order to "identify the rule," the Court looked first to the text of
rule 609130 and then to its legislative history13 ' to determine whether "[the] Rule's plain
language commands weighing of prejudice to a defendant in a civil trial as well as in a crim-
118. 741 F.2d 577 (3d Cir. 1984).
119. Diggs v. Lyons, 471 U.S. 1078 (1985), denying cert. (mrnem.).
120. 741 F.2d 577 (3d Cir. 1984).
121. Diggs, 471 U.S. 1078, 1079.
122. Id. at 1080.
123. Id.
124. Diggs, 741 F.2d at 582.
125. id.
126. 108 S. Ct. 2843 (1988)
127. 109 S. Ct. 1981 (1989).
128. Id. at 1982.
129. Id. at 1984.
130. Id. at 1984-85.
131. Id. at 1985-92.
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inal trial."132 The Court concluded that the balancing language used in the rule indicates
Congressional intent that only criminal defendants should be protected from prejudice by
judicial balancing of probative value against prejudicial effect. 133 The Court based its con-
clusion that rule 609(a)(1)" 'can't mean what it says' ,134 on its recognition that if weighing
of prejudice to a civil defendant were required by the rule, a number of anomalous results
would ensue. First, convictions would always be admissible against civil plaintiffs but not
necessarily against civil defendants.1 3 5 Second, civil plaintiffs would be denied the right to
impeach that is available to civil defendants; 136 and, third, only civil plaintiffs would be
subject to a risk that admission of evidence of prior criminal convictions for impeachment
purposes would shift jury focus "from the worthiness of the litigant's position to the moral
worth of the litigant himself."
137
Having decided that 609(a)(1)'s balancing test is to be applied only with respect to crim-
inal defendants, the Court directed its attention to a consideration of whether the specific
reference to the criminal defendant in rule 609(a)(1) permits rule 403 balancing in the civil
context.1 38 Pointing out that courts have used the balancing test of rule 403 in civil cases
"without resolving the applicability of Rule 609(a)(1)," 131 the Court nonetheless asserted
that "[i]ndeed [this] may be . . . a 'sensible approach.' "140
Perhaps to reinforce its opening remark that its "task" was not "to fashion the rule [it]
deem[ed] desirable," 41 the Court stated: "Prodigious scholarship highlighting the irra-
tionality and unfairness of impeaching credibility with evidence of felonies unrelated to ve-
racity indicates that judicial exercise of discretion is in order,"' 4 2 but in spite of its
acknowledgement that exercise ofjudicial discretion is clearly appropriate in some circum-
stances, the Court carefully stressed that "[i]f Congress intended otherwise . . . judges
must adhere to its decision. 143
The Court based its analysis of the applicability of 403 balancing in civil cases on the
premise that "[a] general statutory rule usually does not govern unless there is no more spe-
cific rule." 1 Determining that since rule 403 is the more general of the two rules, rule
403 discretionary balancing would be appropriate only if rule 609 does not operate in a
civil context, 145 the Court again turned to the language of 609 to resolve the issue. Since
rule 609(a) specifically states that "impeaching convictions evidence 'shall be admitted,' 46
since "this imperative, coupled with the absence of any balancing language, bars exercise
of judicial discretion pursuant to Rule 403 ," 14 and since rule 609(a) contains its own
132. Id. at 1984.
133. Id. at 1992.
134. Id. at 1985 (quoting Campbell v. Greer, 831 F2d 700, 703 (7th Cir. 1987)).
135. Green, 109 S. Ct. at 1985.
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. Id. at 1992.
139. Id. at n.30.
140. Id. at 1992 (quoting Diggs v. Lyons, 741 F.2d 577, 583 (3d Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1978 (1985)).
141. See supra note 3 and accompanying text.




146. Id. at 1993.
147. Id.
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weighing language, the Court concluded that exclusion of civil witnesses from the weigh-
ing language of rule 609(a)(1) mandates admission of evidence of prior criminal convic-
tions for impeachment purposes and overrides the discretionary authority accorded a
judge by rule 403.1 The Court ended its analysis of the relationship between rules 403
and 609(a) as it had begun it-with a reference to the courts that "rely[ ] on Rule 403 to
balance probative value against prejudice to civil witnesses."1 49 But it also added an admo-
nition that courts so doing "depart from the mandatory language of Rule 609."150
Justice Scalia concurred in the judgment but objected to the Court's extensive analysis
of the historical and legislative material relative to a determination of the rule's mean-
ing.151 Scalia suggested that the meaning of "defendant" could more appropriately have
been determined on the basis of its ordinary usage and according to the meaning "most
compatible with the surrounding body of law into which the provision must be inte-
grated. ' 52 Applying these standards, Scalia arrived at the same conclusion as the major-
ity -"defendant" means "criminal defendant. "153
Justice Blackmun, joined by Justices Brennan and Marshall, urged the application of
the balancing provisions of rule 609(a)(1) to all parties rather than just to a criminal de-
fendant 54 and suggested that trial courts have the ability "to weigh the risk of prejudice to
any party before admitting evidence of a prior felony for purposes of impeachment.
1 5
V. ANALYSIS
With its holding in Green the Court acknowledges Congressional intent to protect crimi-
nal defendants from the prejudice which may result from admission of evidence of prior
convictions15 6 but at the same time places parties and witnesses in civil actions in exactly
the jeopardy against which the rule is arguably designed to protect. The Justices were
"persuad[ed] ...that the Rule was meant to authorize a judge to weigh prejudice against
no one other than a criminal defendant." " 7 The Court supports its conclusion with several
conclusory statements: "Had the conferees desired to protect other parties or witnesses,
they could have done so easily," 58 and "[ailternatively, [they] could have amended their
own draft to include other parties,"1 5 9 but they did not do so "for the simple reason that they
intended that only the accused in a criminal case should be protected from unfair prejudice
by the balance set out in Rule 609(a)(1).,
160
The Court agreed with the Seventh Circuit that, insofar as it may be applied in the civil
context, rule 609(a)(1)" 'can't mean what it says.' "161 The Court also recognized that "ev-




151. Green, 109 S. Ct. at 1994 (Scalia, J., concurring).
152. Id. at 1994-95.
153. Id. at 1994.
154. Green, 109 S. Ct. at 1995 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
155. Id. at 1995-96.
156. Id. at 1990.
157. Id. at 1991.
158. Id.
159. Id. at 1992.
160. Id.
161. Id. at 1985 (quoting Campbell v. Greer, 831 F.2d 700, 703 (7th. Cir. 1987)).
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worthiness of the litigant's position to the moral worth of the litigant himself. '162 Its agree-
ment with the Seventh Circuit, in conjunction with its recognition of the likelihood of prej-
udice, seemed to promise that the Court was prepared to answer the Third Circuit
challenge to "eliminate . . . possibilities of injustice."163 However, under the guise of
"identify[ing] the rule that Congress fashioned,"164 the Court has judicially condoned use
of rule 609(a)(1) in such a way that more often than not will result in prejudice from admis-
sion of impeaching evidence of a criminal conviction having little or no relevance to the
issue being civilly litigated and perhaps even less relevance to the witness's credibility.
In his dissenting opinion,16 Justice Blackmun offered an alternative interpretation of
the word "defendant" not encompassed by the majority holding but nonetheless answering
the challenge of the Third Circuit. 166 Blackmun disagreed with the majority holding that
"defendant" should be read "criminal defendant." 167 He also disagreed with its conclusion
that only a criminal defendant is to be accorded the protection of 609(a)(1) balancing. 
168
Blackmun would instead "allow the trial court to consider the risk of prejudice faced by
any party, not just a criminal defendant." 169 He concluded with a strongly worded admon-
ishment: "Applying the balancing provisions of Rule 609(a)(1) to all parties would have
prevented the admission of unnecessary and inflammatory evidence in [Green] . . . ,and
will prevent other similar unjust results until Rule 609(a) is repaired, as it must be."17'
In apparent agreement that the rule must be "repaired," on January 26, 1990, the Su-
preme Court adopted an amendment to rule 609(a)"'1 which allows balancing of probative
value against prejudicial effect in civil cases. The amendment, which has been submitted
to Congress,172 provides:
For the purpose of attacking the credibility of a witness, (1) evidence that a witness other than
an accused has been convicted of a crime shall be admitted, subject to rule 403, if the crime
was punishable by death or imprisonment in excess of one year under the law under which the
witness was convicted, and evidence that an accused has been convicted of such a crime shall
be admitted [if] the court determines that the probative value of admitting this evidence out-
weighs its prejudicial effect to the accused .... 173
If enacted in the form submitted by the Supreme Court, rule 609(a)(1) will resolve any
ambiguity with respect to the proper application of discretionary balancing in the civil con-
text. However, the proposed effective date for the amended rule is not until December 1,
1990.174 This delayed effective date allows Congress sufficient time to act should it deter-
162. Green, 109 S. Ct. at 1985.
163. Diggs v. Lyons, 741 F.2d 577, 582 (3d Cir. 1984).
164. Green. 109 S. Ct. at 1984.
165. Id. at 1995-98.




170. Id. (emphasis added).
171. Amendments to Rule 609(a) (1) and (2), U.S.L. W.D. (BNA) at 2 (Feb. 1, 1990).
172. Amendment to Federal Rules of Evidence Submitted to Congress (Feb. 13, 1990) (Westlaw Bulletin).
173. Amendments to Rule 609(a) (1) and (2), U.S.L.W.D. (BNA) at 2-3 (Feb. 1, 1990).
174. Id. at 3.
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mine that the Supreme Court amendment is not in accordance with the legislative intent
that the Court so scrupulously analyzed in Green. 75
Until the Supreme Court's amended rule 609(a)(1) becomes effective as proposed,
Green remains good law and requires that felony conviction evidence for impeachment
purposes be automatically admitted in a civil case. 176 But if, as the Green Court deter-
mined, Congress intended that only a criminal defendant be protected by the balancing of
probative value against prejudicial effect so that Congress therefore rejects the proposed
changes and amends rule 609(a)(1) to continue to allow balancing to protect only a crimi-
nal defendant from possible prejudice, the effects of the legislated amendment and the
Green decision will be the same-evidence of a felony conviction will be automatically ad-
missible to impeach the credibility of a civil witness. 177 As a result, the Green decision has
significant implications, especially for those attorneys practicing in the civil arena, but
even more especially for those attorneys practicing in circuits that, prior to Green, had
considered the possibility of prejudice prior to admitting felony conviction evidence for
impeachment purposes.
In conclusion, denied the protection of either 403 or 609(a)(1) balancing, a post-Green
civil litigant, whether plaintiff or defendant, dare not take the stand in a civil suit unless he
is willing to risk being considered "unworthy of belief' 78 because he has been convicted of
a felony.
Sandra Schuffert Mohler
175. See supra notes 129-148 and accompanying text.
176. See supra note 148 and accompanying text.
177. See supra note 133 and accompanying text.
178. WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE, supra note 26, at 609-58.
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